APRA’s CPS 511 Remuneration requires APRA-regulated entities (banks, insurers and superannuation RSEs) to make significant changes to remuneration governance systems supporting the design of remuneration arrangements and award of variable remuneration. The new prudential standard is already in effect for large ADIs and will apply to large insurers and superannuation RSEs from 1 July 2023.
CPS 511 requires entities to:
- enhance Board remuneration governance oversight;
- ensure the compensation paid to third-party service providers does not drive non-financial risk and conduct risks;
- design variable remuneration (for all employees) that consider non-financial risk and conduct outcomes, reflects the time horizon of risk (i.e. should deferral occur?), and grants the entity a right to downwardly adjust variable remuneration outcomes in respect to financial risk and conduct outcomes;
- defer substantial portions of variable remuneration for significant financial institutions; and
- ensure that variable remuneration outcomes reflect the conduct and risk outcomes (not just financial outcomes) of the entity, including by applying in-period, malus and clawback adjustment.
The changes bring the regulation of Australia’s financial service sector pay and bonus more in line with some of Australia’s peers, particularly those in Europe and the UK.
CPS 511 has commenced progressively:
So what are the key lessons learned from the first 6 months of CPS 511’s implementation and how should that shape other entities’ implementation?
Key lessons learned
Based on our experience advising banks, insurers and superannuation RSEs, the key challenges implementing CPS 511 are:
The issue
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The challenge
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What good looks like
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Third-party service providers |
CPS 511 requires an entity’s remuneration policy to set out the entity’s approach to identify and mitigate conflicts between the compensation payable to third-party service providers and entity’s remuneration framework objectives. Determining which third-parties are ‘in-scope’, when a conflict arises, and what should be done about a conflict is challenging. APRA’s policy objective is to ensure that its entities do not circumvent CPS 511’s obligations on employee remuneration through the use of third-party service providers, and also to ensure third-party service provider compensation does not negatively impact customers and the entity’s risk profile. |
Good implementation ensures that third-party service providers are:
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Company group arrangements |
It is common for group company structures to include a single employing entity, with the services of employees provided to the rest of the companies in the group. Complexity arises where only one entity in the group is APRA regulated and bound by CPS 511. Identifying the ‘specified role’ persons for that regulated entity is challenging, particularly where employees serve multiple roles and only one may be a ‘specified role’ for the APRA regulated entity. |
Good implementation ensures:
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Determining deferral proportions (and when!) |
Senior executives tend to be eligible to receive variable remuneration under multiple schemes (STI, LTI, retention, sign-on awards, etc.). It is common for entities to inform senior executives at the start of a performance year of their STI target opportunity and prospective deferral outcomes to provide executives with cashflow certainty. Unlike BEAR, CPS 511 broadly defines variable remuneration to mean any remuneration that is conditional on an objective (including, service and performance based conditions). CPS 511’s deferral obligation will apply to ad hoc awards like retention, sign-on, and buy-out awards. Difficulties arise where prior deferral calculations are disturbed by the grant of ad hoc awards, or where there is a material overperformance under an STI award. |
Good implementation ensures:
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‘Material weight’ and non-financial measures |
For many entities implementation of non-financial performance measures as a performance or vesting condition that have material weight in remuneration outcomes is a new concept. Determining what measures to implement, what variable remuneration to apply the measures to, how they will be assessed, and when they will be assessed can be complex. Moreover, determining the weight (material weight must be given to non-financial measures cumulatively) to place on the measures is challenging. |
Good implementation ensures:
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Specified role identification |
Some of the definitions used to determine specified role persons (e.g. senior managers) are complex and requires a factual assessment of persons’ roles in circumstances where there is very little guidance regarding the scope of the defined specified roles in CPS 511 or its guidance. For example CPG 511 unhelpfully states, “Senior manager is defined in CPS 511 and takes into account the impact that an individual can have on the business of the entity or an entity’s financial standing. Senior managers would typically include the direct reports of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). For larger entities, it may be appropriate to include a range of executives from the next level below direct reports to the CEO.” Determining specified roles is a difficult exercise with significant consequences for those designated as specified role persons. Also, as some of the specific role definitions have changed since earlier prudential standard (e.g. material risk taker), re-examination of prior designations or identification frameworks may be required. |
Good implementation ensures:
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Deferral and vesting schedules |
There is a surprising degree of complexity with respect to the deferral and vesting schedules in CPS 511, including the determination of the deferral period and deferral amount. CPS 511 represents a shift away from the approach that many ADIs adopted under BEAR by requiring deferral of variable remuneration earned in respect of a performance year, rather than the year in which variable remuneration outcomes are determined or paid. CPS 511’s approach is consistent with the requirement under the current FAR Bill. Entities will also need to ensure that any pro rata vesting is consistent with CPS 511’s requirements. |
Good implementation ensures:
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Importance of a cohesive remuneration framework |
CPS 511 uses the undefined term ‘remuneration framework’ to describe the totality of processes and systems regulated as part of CPS 511. In addition to a written remuneration policy meeting the requirements of CPS 511, the practical reality is that a range of supporting documents describing the systems and processes to support remuneration governance are required to comply with CPS 511. |
Good implementation ensures:
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What next? – Board remuneration governance and oversight
CPS 511 requires enhanced Board remuneration governance in three key respects:
- Information – the Board’s remuneration committee must receive ‘sufficient’ information about financial and non-financial risk and conduct outcomes over the period that variable remuneration is deferred (i.e. up to 6 years in the case of the CEO’s deferred variable remuneration). Most entities will tend to rely on formulaic quantitative assessments for the purposes of financial performance. For non-financial outcomes a qualitative assessment will need to be made in light of all of the non-financial risk and conduct matters over the relevant period. This will require appropriate input from the risk function to ensure informed variable remuneration decisions can be made.
- Consequence management – in our experience entity’s consequence management frameworks tend to be focused on misconduct related matters. The challenge for Boards under CPS 511 will be to develop a mature consequence management framework that addresses poor management outcomes and accountability failings. Information and reporting arrangements to Boards will be key in supporting these arrangements.
- Determination– Equipped with the information above, the Board must ensure that their variable remuneration outcome decisions align to the entity’s financial and non-financial risk outcomes. Entities should ensure that decisions have regard to all of the available factual material when determining variable remuneration outcomes, and that there is a documented basis for the outcomes in the event those decisions are later scrutinised by APRA.
What next? - Remuneration disclosure?
APRA has indicated that it will implement a remuneration disclosure regime associated with CPS 511 in the first half of 2023. After requesting industry consultation in late 2022, we anticipate that APRA will moderate their draft remuneration disclosure regime which was disproportionately burdensome. APRA’s remuneration disclosure policy goal appears to be that public disclosure will enable third parties to examine remuneration arrangements and variable remuneration outcomes (i.e. the media). If that eventuates, Board remuneration governance in the financial services sector will be in the spotlight even more than ever.